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1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Distributed or decentralized energy resources
(DER) can be split into two distinct types, DG
(Distributed Generation) and DR (Demand
Response). The latter includes energy efficiency
(usually requiring capital) and load shifting and
shedding, which is a cost saving exercise.
While both segments have a part to play in
providing a more secure and stable electricity
supply environment, this paper addresses only
the first segment, DG, which is the connection
of small to medium scale generators
at the distribution network level and the
barriers to its increased adoption.
The paper is aimed at understanding the
market in which DG is competing and proposes
possible interventions based on this analysis.
There are three distinct types of DG:
• Type one is the standby generator de-
signed for security of supply (eg for
computer installations or hotels) or for
peak lopping which may operate less than
100 hours per year.  In Standby DG we
include both generators that are synchro-
nized with the Grid as well as those which
are not but once the load is temporarily
disconnected from the network they start
up.
• Type two is that which is dependent on an
intermittent or inexact fuel supply (eg run
of river micro hydro, photovoltaics or wind
generators), this is semi base load, in that
it runs as much as it’s fuel supply allows.
• Type three is base load generation which
to be economic is usually of the CHP
variety (eg Industrial co-generation or a
domestic Stirling engine arrangement) or
runs on a supply of free fuel, such as
methane extracted from a landfill site or
sewerage pipes or coal seams.
Type one arrangements are hard to justify if
installed for peak lopping only (ref. Appendix
IV), owing mainly to the capital cost of $/MW
installed. However, where a diesel or gas
engine is installed for security purposes such
as part of a computer uninterruptible power
supply (UPS) arrangement, it can also be used
economically to ‘peak lop’ when energy prices
are high or when system transmission capacity
peaks occur. This use depends on price. That
is, DG owners must receive timely control
period (price) signals from their Distributor or
peak buy back prices from their Retailer which
provide sufficient incentive for them to act.
The type two arrangement is very location
specific and entered into only after consider-
able monitoring of the fuel resource and an
estimate of load factors have been undertaken.
The third type as a co-generation plant is again
site specific but provided there is a sufficient
heat sink to match the electrical and heat
output of a generator, overall energy
efficiencies in the 70-80% range can be
reached and these efficiencies coupled with
operating hours of greater than 6000 hrs per
year usually provide viable projects. Most
economic opportunities for this arrangement at
the Industrial level have been utilized.
There are also distinct DG size bands as
experienced in the New Zealand Market, with
each having its particular barriers and issues.
• Band one is below 10kW which is typical
for households and includes PV’s, small
engine gen sets, micro CHP and small wind
mill battery chargers or pumps. Usually
these systems include an inverter which
produces harmonics. Harmonics need to be
filtered out so that the quality of network
supply to others is not compromised.
• Band two is between 10kW and 1 MW.  This
includes commercial standby generation
usually diesel or gas engines or small gas
turbines as well as some rural mini-hydro
schemes.
• Band three is 1-5MW which is where Line
companies might invest, or have an interest
in generation. Diesels, mobile gasturbines,
and small hydro are likely contenders here.
Waste methane fuelled gas engines used at
landfills or sewerage works are also
typically in this range.
• Band four is 5-50MW which currently covers
line companies investing in renewables
(wind or geothermal or hydro) but line
companies are required under the arms
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length rules to have a separate company to
undertake this investment.
Industrial co-generation installations and
potentially Industrials investing in wind or tidal
generation also come into this band.  Co-gen
systems may be biomass fuelled and/or natural
gas/coal fuelled. Small hydro stations are also
contenders.  Typically there is a large propor-
tion of renewables in this band.  At the higher
end of the band, because of short circuit
current issues, a generator usually tends to
connect directly to the (Transmission) Grid,
leaving it outside our definition of DG.
There is another break-point within this band
at 10MW.  Above 10MWe1 you are required to
have TOU (Time of Use) metering (full half hour
logs) and will probably be required to provide
this information to the System Operator
(Transpower) on a continuous basis. That is,
offer into the pool. This has a compliance cost.
The largest ‘questionable’ DG in NZ at present
is at Kinleith (35MWe), which is ‘deemed
embedded’ for the purposes of Transmission
charges but does connect through a three
winding Transformer to the network 33 kV bus
(via a normally open isolator) as well as the
110kV Grid.  This was done as the cheapest
alternative to limit short circuit current.  The
alternative to deemed embedding would have
been a very expensive 11kV reactor.  The
electricity generated is all consumed at site.
That is, the Kinleith demand is around 80MWe
and the site is always a net importer of
electricity, regardless of the fact that there is a
Grid connection to provide the equivalent of
reactors by using the transformers out to the
grid and the transformers back into the site.
Note that the BHP/NZ Steel embedded genera-
tion is > 50MW and therefore falls outside this
discussion paper. (refer Appendix 1 for a list of
known DG schemes.
From the following analysis, we believe that
residential DG (<10kW) is only likely to be
economic if either the consumer remains a net
purchaser at all times or has a TOU meter
installed which allows generation to be fed
back to the network at selected times of peak
prices where a significant incentive price is
paid for energy and/or capacity by the retailer
or lines company respectively.  Unfortunately
on hot summer days when every one is at
work household load can be very small and
excess generation is likely to be available. This
is the time when energy prices are likely to be
low. Typically only enthusiasts invest in this
area and it is more for self sufficiency/security
of supply reasons than a commercially eco-
nomic payback.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that mini-hydros
in the 0.3 to 2MW range can be economic
investments provided that a reasonable/fair
energy contract with a Retailer can be estab-
lished.
The new draft regulations issued by MED
October 2006 for discussion but aiming to be
gazetted before Christmas cover many of the
issues between Distributor and DG owner.
However, there still appear to be ways by
which a line company could choose to effec-
tively negate the intention of the regulations,
to the detriment of the DG owner.
We, note here that the World Alliance for
Decentralised Energy (WADE) says in its 2006
market assessment that 24% of electricity
output from newly installed power generation
plants in 2005 was derived from DG up from
13% in 2002.  There is an emerging global
recognition that generation at the point of
demand results in reduced need for costly
investment in Transmission and possibly
distribution networks as well as environmental
benefits, reduced losses and increased security
of supply.
As far as New Zealand is concerned it is the
author’s view that for improved uptake of DG
one or more of the following should be in place:
A. A regulation which requires retailers to
provide a ‘limited spread’ Fixed Price
Variable Volume contract (FPVV) to DG
operators. ‘Limited spread’ refers to the
differential between what the Retailer
would charge a load at the point of
connection (for energy only), compared to
the price a Retailer would pay a Distributed
Generator at the same point of connection.
Using the Energyhedge2 approach this
1. MWe = MW electrical, a convention used to differentiate
between MWth = MW thermal. This is particularly useful
when doing energy balances for example with a co-
generation system.
2 ‘Energyhedge’ is an inter-generator financial platform
requiring participants to continuously post two-way prices
(buy and sell) on 0.25MW quarterly hedge contracts going
out (currently) two years.   See www.energyhedge.co.nz
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‘spread’ should be limited to 10%. Note
that the Photovoltaic association has
negotiated a zero spread arrangement for
residential DG with Contact. That is Contact
will pay the retail price for fed back
electricity for < 5kW residential installations.
B. If item A above were mandated, then there
would be no need for Distributors to be
Retailers and neither would there be any
requirement/need for Distributors to be
able to deal in financial instruments such
as hedges (or contracts for differences).
C. Line companies should be required to
provide a rebate of Transpower’s intercon-
nection charges based on the DG output at
the times of regional peak.
D. If the regional DG is aggregated, the
Distributor will be sure that if a ‘control
period’ is indicated it can count on at least
60% of the aggregate DG capacity being
started.  This has considerable value to
certain Distributors.  The value of lost load
should be considered in these calculations
and/or the value of delayed network or
Transmission investment. (Orion’s approach
to using DG owned by third parties).
E. DG operators should be required to pay for
any DG specific upgrade of the network
required to connect to the network. This
can be paid ‘up front as a lump sum’ or
amortised over the life of the plant at the
DG operators option. (Two way metering,
protection relays and a transformer or line
upgrade if necessary to support the DG
could be possible inclusions). The line
company should be required to obtain
three separate quotes for the equipment
and installation and the DG owner should
have the option of procuring the necessary
assets himself.  In the future, should a third
party benefit from the line upgrade paid for
by the DG owner, a rebate or reduced line
charge should accrue to the DG owner.
F. Line Company’s need to compensate DG
operators for Reactive power generated
(KVARs).
G. If there is a political desire to increase the
uptake of DG, a subsidy may be required.
One such incentive would be a $/MW
installed contribution for new DG installa-
tions.  This is what operates in the UK and
underlies their recent sustainability policy,
or a $/MWh subsidy as used in Holland.
H. Another form of subsidy for renewables
(again which links into the Governments
framework on sustainability) is an MRET
scheme. That is, a Minimum Renewable
Energy Target scheme underpinned by
tradable renewable energy certificates
(RECs) as seen in a few countries but in
particular Australia. (refer item 9). The
Australian scheme should be modified and
improved for New Zealand by having both
Thermal and Electrical RECs where a
thermal REC is about a third of the value of
an electrical REC.  This allows a balanced
incentive for co-generation versus pure
electrical generation, a feature missing in
the Australian scheme.
Under these schemes, effectively all
consumers of electricity pay a very small
extra amount which is used to provide a
worthwhile (in the region say of 3c/kWh)
subsidy to new renewable generation.
I. With the thresholds regime, governing
Distributors, the issue of cross-
subsidisation by Distributors of inefficient
generation from monopoly profits should
no longer be a potential issue. There is an
argument that the arms length separation
rules for Distributor owned generation
between 5and 50MW could be relaxed, in
particular the need for an independent
board for the generation subsidiary.
Page 8 DG: Understanding the Market
Page 9DG: Understanding the Market
2  INTRODUCTION: Definitions and Pros and
cons of DG
2.1 Definitions
After considerable discussion we believe the
definition of DG for New Zealand can be stated
as:
Distributed Generation in New
Zealand includes any electrical
generator below 50MW which is
connected at the
distribution network level, or
which is used when a load is
temporarily disconnected from
the network to reduce network
load.
This definition includes standby and base-load
generators and suggests a preference for
locations near to loads where the generated
electrons are consumed before leaving the
premises let alone the region. Generators such
as ‘Pioneer’3 are included.
This definition excludes generators connected
directly to the grid, which must offer into the
pool4.  These are usually merchant generators
and currently those owned by the three SOEs
(Mighty River Power, Genesis and Meridian) as
well as Contact and Trustpower.
The recent DG regulations paper for discussion
issued by MED which concerns the connection
contract issues between a potential DG owner/
operator and the regional line company (ref
Appendix III) has defined DG as plant that:
(a) is connected or proposed to be connected
to a distribution network, or to a consumer
installation that is connected to a distribu-
tion network; and
(b) is capable of exporting electricity back into
that distribution network.
Orion has made the following comment in
relation to DG definition in their Pricing Guide
for 2006:
Embedded generators, also
known as ‘distributed genera-
tors’ are generators located at a
home or business which are
capable of generating electricity
for that home or business’s own
use.  They may also be capable
of putting surplus electricity
back into our network.  These
generators can take many forms;
diesel generators, wind turbines
and solar panels are the most
common.
Distributed Energy Resources include both DG
(Distributed Generation) as well as DR (De-
mand Response) as shown in Fig 1.
Figure 1 is effectively a schematic of consumer
3 Pioneer generation Ltd runs a number of small hydro
stations in central Otago and is Trust owned ref.
www.electricityinquiry.govt.nz/submissions/288.pdf;
www.pioneergen.co.nz
4 Refers to the NZ electricity spot market pool where offers
and bids are received, generators dispatched to meet
demand and nodal spot market prices discovered every
half hour - refer section 6
DG – Distributed Generation 
Base Load 
(energy) 
CHP,Wind,hydro,PV 
Standby 
(capacity) 
Diesels 
DR – Demand Response  
(DSM – Demand Side 
Management) 
 Energy Efficiency  (capex) 
Load Shifting and Shedding 
(cost optimisation - 
 reduced Opex) 
DER – Distributed Energy Resources 
           (CAE’s Energy 21 Group) 
Renewables 
Fossil fuels 
Synchronised 
 
Not synchronised 
Fuel Substitution  
(eg Solar Water Heating) 
Figure 1: Split of Distributed Energy Resources
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response options to Price and Security issues.
That is, a consumer has a number of options,
which are captured in this diagram, to react to
volatile or high electricity prices or poor
security of supply, where Generation, transmis-
sion or distribution failure or constraints cause
power outages and/or high prices. However,
this paper focuses on DG rather than DR.
We have chosen to split the sizes of DG into
four distinct ranges to match the likely applica-
tions or owners.  These are:
 •   Less than 10 kW – this includes all
residential sites and rural schools. Typically
small petrol engine sets, micro hydros and
Photovoltaics are used.
• 10kW -1.0MW – This includes commercial,
hospitals, hotels, computer centres, ports
and airport applications.  Typically large
diesels and gas engines and mini-hydro.
• 1.0-5 MW – This is a typical size for a lines
company where the generator is not
renewably fuelled. Typically Large Diesels
and gas engines and small gas and steam
turbines. Currently lines companies can
invest in any DG if <5MW or 2% of their
peak, without legal complication.
It is also the unit size for renewably fuelled
gas engines using methane extracted from
landfills or sewerage works or coal seams.
• 5-50MW – This is mainly base load indus-
trial applications such as a turbine in a co-
generation application or a lines company
wind farm. If DG > 5MW but < 50MW or 20%
of Peak a lines company may currently
invest but must undertake corporate
separation of the DG venture - (known as
the ‘arms length rules, requiring separate
Boards).
2.2  The Benefits and
Detractors of DG
Benefits of DG
• Reduced line losses – generation closer to
load
• Increased security of supply – shorter
supply chain & diversity of smaller types of
DG.
• Reduced likelihood of binding constraints
on Transmission feeding  the region which
create higher nodal prices
• Often renewably fuelled – as a rule DG is
usually more fuel flexible (wind, waste
methane, wood gasifier using a local
resource). Environmental advantages.
• Combined Heat and Power (CHP) configura-
tions are more energy efficient than Grid
connected electricity only Generators (GG’s)
• Can improve local voltage level
• Can reduce Transmission costs and/or delay
upgrades
• Can reduce Network costs and/or delay
upgrades
• Can generate reactive power, reducing local
loadings and substituting for capacitor
banks.
• Aggregation of regional DG’s can be bid
into the Reserves market.
Detractors of DG
• Higher cost per KW to install than the
bigger grid connected generators (eg
Whirinaki)
• Possibly more expensive fuel (eg supply
contracts say for Gas are likely to have a
higher price/GJ than for a large SOE)
• Transmission capacity is frequently cheaper
to build than small local generation units,
but often needs to be built anyway.
• Intermittent generation may increase
frequency keeping costs. Causer pays
regime would see an additional burden on
say a small (0.2-1.0MW) local wind turbine
operation.
• Local network implications on planning,
operations and safety.
• Negotiation of connection can be complex
and take a long time.
• Ripple control is effectively free to
Transpower.
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3  THE DG ENVIRONMENT
To develop this paper, interviews were under-
taken with a number of the entities detailed in
the diagram below (also refer appendix II).
Key issues of interest were:
• Lines companies wanting to be Retailers.
Understanding the energy sales bargaining
power (or perceived lack of )  and lack of
Board control of Lines companies wishing
to invest in DG over 5MW under current
regulations.
• The new retail benchmark contract issued
by the Electricity Commission for consulta-
tion (for DG < 40,000 kWh pa. Which is  ~
5kW base load)
• Connection issues/costs/prevarication
particularly if a DG proposer were not a
lines Co.
• Conversely if a lines company’s asset
management plan (public) indicates a
future possible power station site it is
important to avoid speculative buying up of
access rights/land by unconnected parties
• Financial justification/feasibility/value of DG
for its different segments (roughly: residen-
tial, commercial, lines co’s, Industrials),
both to the investor and the Country.
• RMA issues and the desire for regions’
environmental regulators to see DG as a
local resource worth promoting.
These issues reinforce the necessity to under-
stand the market structure and mechanisms
within which DG is to operate. The rest of this
paper is aimed at addressing that issue.
Distributed 
Generation 
Industrial companies (forestry, fertilizer, dairy, meat) 
Commercial  
(hotels, packaging, glass, metal 
Manufacturers, computer 
centres, airports, ports) 
MED (energy policy) 
EC (Electricity Regulation 
Physical & Financial Markets) 
Lines Co’s (limited ability, 
          Competition issues) 
Commerce Commission 
(Market power issues) 
EECA (energy efficiency 
 & Renewables) 
PCE (Political/ 
 environmental Overview) 
Local Govt.  (RMA) 
MfE (climate change, 
carbon sequestration)  
Minister of Energy 
(political/policy) 
Figure 2: The DG Environment
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4  POLICY GOALS FOR DG
The goals to improve the uptake of DG can be
expressed as:
Positioning DG in the NZ electricity market as a
viable option by reducing  ‘barriers to entry’
for DG investment.
The following list encapsulates those policy
goals.
• The connection costs to the network should
not be excessive
• If required to Offer and Bid into the
electricity pool (<10MW), the rules should
be varied to allow use of net bids if an
entity’s generation offers are always smaller
than its demand bids. Another alternative
may be the acceptance of a persistence
model for implicit offers to the pool for
industrial co-generation, similar to intermit-
tent wind generation (ref Electricity Govern-
ance Rules for wind generation).
• Sale of excess generation at the spot price
to the incumbent Retailer as of right. This
is able to be done directly with the clearing
manager, but often it is easier to deal with
one’s local Retailer.  Usually this can be
accomplished but there is no obligation on
the Retailer to do so.
• Ability to obtain FPVV (Fixed Price Variable
Volume) contracts for excess generation
from a Retailer with ‘limited spread’
between that FPVV energy supply contract
and an FPVV energy demand contract at
the same or electrically/locationally similar
offtake node.
• Power quality requirements not to be
unreasonably excessive - in particular a
common standard for residential inverters
<10kVA which requires no further individual
electrical analysis/compliance document/
decision from the lines co.
• Favorable status under RMA to have DG
recognized as a local resource.
• Protect project originators from Line
company negativity or delay to originators’
proposals for connection /stability studies/
excessive compliance costs which need to
be done by the line company.
• clarify metering protocols for different DG
sizes. Ensure any new metering systems
provide separate registers for each power
direction. Improve metering standard/
functionality and reduce cost
• Move DG from tailored/niche solutions to
more standard/pre-engineered products –
(mainstream DG – particularly at the
residential level)
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5  WHAT DG OPERATORS NEED
TO BE ECONOMIC
DG does not suit everybody.
The first consideration is the amount that
electricity costs, as a percentage of one’s
overheads.
For instance, this may be 15% for a residential
customer, 5% for a commercial customer, and
10% for a large Industrial.  Clearly, the bigger
the percentage and dollar amount the more
focus the issues get. For residential customers,
a higher income bracket will be a significant
influence on ability to invest in DG.
Another consideration is the region in the
country in which one resides.  Clearly the more
remote and/or capacity constrained the more
beneficial DG is likely to be.  It is also a
customer specific issue as to the value of
security. What is the consumer’s voll (value of
lost load)?
A third consideration is fuel. For instance a
higher average regional temperature will favour
PV’s and solar water heating substituting for
electricity generation from the Grid.  Similarly a
flowing river with a high head or consistent
volume is necessary for a small hydro and
biomass in abundance is necessary for wood
gasifiers for instance.
Once these issues have been considered, it is
necessary to get an energy contract that
provides sufficient revenue and a lines contract
that has a limited cost and does not display
any double dipping by the lines co.  That is,
assuming as a consumer you are already
paying a line charge (usually of the form X c/
day residential or Y$/kW MD for Industrial), you
should only need to pay an additional ‘connec-
tion assets charge’ specific to the connection of
your DG and not another line charge, all things
being equal.
If the ‘connection charges’ include upgrading
the line, then you need to anticipate any
rebates from other parties who might subse-
quently utilize any new capacity.
You need to work out your operating regime
then do a cashflow analysis.
The discounted cashflow analysis needs to
have a positive NPV, where the discount rate
reflects the relative riskiness of the project over
and above the cost of capital.
Page 16 DG: Understanding the Market
Page 17DG: Understanding the Market
6  THE ELECTRICITY MARKET
To facilitate discussion on issues related to the
sale of surplus electricity generated from DG
installations, an understanding of the peculiari-
ties of The New Zealand electricity market can
be helpful.
The NZ electricity market can be simply
depicted by three arms as below:
1 Physical – ie the flow of electrons when a
consumer turns on a switch.
2 Payment for the physical – through retailers
paying the pool and the pool paying the
merchant generators at the various spot
prices.
3 Financial  – where spot price risks are
mitigated.
So, the consumer turns on the switch and the
electrons flow by the laws of physics from the
remote Generators through Transpower,
through the local distributor to the consumer.
(For some large Industrial consumers who are
connected directly to the Grid, the Distributor
is by-passed.)
At the time of consumption, the spot price is
not known by the Direct consumer or the
Retailer, but is established by price discovery
when the actual demand (post consumption) is
matched with the supply stack established
before consumption. The system operator
dispatches generation from this merit order
stack and a set of prices are discovered.  The
pool price is therefore set effectively by the
last dispatched generator - (there are excep-
tions such as Spring washer effects, but they
are beyond the scope/purpose of this paper).
By this process, some 255 nodal prices are
established each half hour in arrears.
In the second arm, the consumed electrons
need to be paid for, which is done by the pool
clearing manager paying the Generator the
relevant nodal spot price (spot 1) on the
amount dispatched from that injection node.
The Pool receives a payment from the Retailer
for the energy consumed at the relevant
demand nodes at the relevant nodal price
(spot 2).  As Spot 2 in aggregate is greater
than Spot 1 a surplus of money is accumulated
in the Pool.  This amount is caused by losses
and constraints on the grid.  These ‘loss and
constraint rentals’ are currently paid to
Transpower who pass them through to Distribu-
tors in proportion to the Transmission charges
the Distributor pays Transpower on their
relevant connection assets.  These rentals are
however an ideal source of funds to hedge
against location risk and it is likely that they
will in future be used for this purpose by the
Pool giving them to the Retailers who would
forward them to their consumers, thereby
 
 
Generators 
 
Consumers 
Transpower  
Pool 
Retailer 
or Agent 
1. Physical 
2. Payment  
    for Physical 
         @Spot 1 
3. Financial 
(CfD’s&Caps 
& Collars 
@Spot 2 
Rentals (spot2-spot1) 
Arrow direction indicates 
 cash flow or electron flow  
FPVV NPVV 
FPFV Distributor 
DG 
Figure 3: The New Zealand Electricity Markets
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mitigating the nodal price peaks caused mainly
by binding modeled constraints on the grid.
There are two other important considerations
with instantaneous matching of supply and
demand.  The first is frequency keeping which
currently costs about $60Million pa and the
second is the reserves market, where genera-
tion and/or sheddable loads are paid to be ‘in
reserve’.  There are two markets: the ‘generate/
shed within 6 secs’ (fast) and the ‘generate/
shed in 60 secs.’(sustained – which has to
remain in/out for 15mins).  This is necessary to
deal with unplanned outage, either generation
plant failure or transmission, leading to supply
shortage.
We now look at the third arm, the financial or
hedging market.  The Retailer can either act as
an agent for a large consumer and for a fee,
pass through spot prices to the consumer.  This
puts the spot price risk on the consumer who
will look to Generators (natural issuers) to
purchase CfD’s (contracts for differences,
colloquially known as Hedges), or caps or
collars.  CfD’s are FPFV (Fixed Price Fixed
Volume) contracts. CfD’s are a liability regardless
of the amount of physical electricity one takes.
We note here that it is often not possible to
obtain a CfD at the node of off-take but only at
a generation node. This is an additional
mismatch risk to a consumer operating in the
spot market.
However, the more usual operation of a
Retailer is to provide a customer/consumer
with an FPVV (Fixed Price Variable Volume)
Contract. As the Retailer is paying the Pool
‘spot’, the risk rests with the Retailer, who
should seek a hedge from a generator to
mitigate its spot price risk.  However, the big 4
Generators own large retail bases (hereafter
referred to as Gentailers) and provide their
retailer with an implicit hedge.  On the diagram
we have used NPVV (no price variable volume)
contract for the implicit financial arrangement
within Gentailers.  If vertical integration were
not allowed, then these Retailers would have
had to obtain explicit hedges.
There is also an inter-Gentailer hedge trading
platform known as Energyhedge2.  The four big
Gentailers were founding members of
Energyhedge and Trustpower has recently
joined. As some generators are predominantly
hydro and others thermal, inter-generator
hedging is a prudent risk management tech-
nique.
Energyhedge requires participants to post two-
way prices for standardised 0.25 MW contracts
designated at Haywards.  The participants have
to post prices with a limited spread, for
quarterly contracts out 2 years, with monthly
contracts for the one or two early months.  We
anticipate that the Energyhedge protocol will
be extended to require quarterly bids and
offers out 3 years and indicative price matrices
for other key nodes based on historical
location factors using the Haywards quotes.
While participation in Energyhedge is theoreti-
cally open to anyone who wishes to meet the
rules, in reality, consumers are not in the
business of being market makers for electricity
prices.  That is, they would be speculating by
posting two way prices with a limited spread at
Haywards on a continuous basis.  This means
that a consumer interested in obtaining a
hedge will need to transact through a Gentailer
participant.
This forward curve derived by Energyhedge
should benefit feasibility studies into DG, even
though it is likely to only extend out three
years.  The value of Energyhedge is not so
much the number and size of the transactions
that go through it (they are relatively limited),
but the forward price curve that is publicly
available.
2 Ibid
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Figure 4: A typical forward price curve from
EnergyHedge (www.energyhedge.co.nz)
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A typical forward price curve from EnergyHedge
is depicted in Figure 4. This curve was valid at
mid May 2006. M06-06 refers to the early
month of June 2006, thereafter the prices are
set by quarters.
The CfD
The CfD (Contract for Differences), is a financial
instrument, where liabilities are established
which are independent of the actual amount of
electricity consumed or generated.
We outline in Figure 5 a simplified diagram
showing the transactions between a Generator
(and issuer of a hedge) and a Consumer (in
this case being a purchaser of that hedge.
With regard to DG, an operator is in one of two
situations. Either:
a The DG operator is generating less electric-
ity, at all times, than he/she consumes.
That is there is never net export to the
grid.  In which case the DG is a natural
hedge and no additional electricity pur-
chase contract is necessarily required to
make the DG more feasible. (eg an embed-
ded co-generation plant where DG output is
less than the manufacturing plant demand
is always a net purchaser)
b The DG operator is, in some or all circum-
stances, a net generator as seen by the
Network. In this case the DG operator does
want some certainty of revenue but also
preferably no risk of being exposed to spot
price risk when unable to deliver. The DG
operator cannot be sure of more than say
95% availability of its plant, therefore it
optimally wants a contract which has no
liability when the DG is down for any
reason.  This would not be a financial CfD,
which would effectively create a liability to
settle against the spot price during the
periods when the DG was down, or up as
the case may be.
On the other hand, if a third party spot
consumer were to enter a contract with a DG
operator to purchase electricity, the third party
would want to hold a hedge contract to
mitigate spot price risk on the amount of
electricity that the DG was not supplying in
times of  DG failure.  While the consumer could
take a CfD with another Gentailer,
this would create a situation where the
consumer would be overhedged when the DG
was operating correctly, assuming the con-
sumer has a physical energy supply contract
with the DG owner.
So the third party would optimally want a
financial instrument which only came into
effect when the DG was down.  This could be
an option.  That is, a right but not an obliga-
tion for a consumer to settle a CfD - (A
Gentailer to sell a call option to a consumer).
One simpler instrument may be a cap, allowing
Issuer 
(Generator) 
Purchaser 
(customer) 
QA x PS  (Physical) 
QN x PS  (financial) 
QN x PH (financial) 
The Hedge = QN x (PH - PS) 
Where: QA = Quantity Actual.   QN = Quantity Nominal 
   PS = Price Spot       PH = Price Hedge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total payment = Physical + Financial 
 (Whether 50% or 100% hedged, incentive  
  to shed if the spot price is high, remains)  
Figure 5: Hedges (the CfD) (the arrows indicate cashflows)
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a hedge price settlement if the spot price went
above say 10c/kWh.  This would be even better
if it could be operative only when the DG was
forced out.
Alternatively, a ‘b type’ DG operator would be
in the best position if he/she were able to
obtain a reasonably priced FPVV physical
contract from a third party.  This party is most
likely to be a Gentailer where the DG output is
insignificant in comparison to the generation
assets and diversity of demand contracts of the
Gentailer.
This type of contract would be ideal for a line
company DG owner.
The question is what is reasonable when
establishing an FPVV price for a DG operator.
There are a number of guiding possibilities.
1 At the relevant DG injection point, are there
corresponding takeoff FPVV contracts?  If
so, what price level?
2 Does the DG cause capacity problems or
instability in the local network? (this is not
a direct issue for an energy contract, but
must be sorted out before a DG can inject
back into the network).
3 Does the DG stabilize energy prices by
reducing (modeled) constraints on the Grid?
4 Does the DG reduce or delay Transmission
cost increases to the Network?
5 Should meters in houses with micro DG just
run backwards, thereby offsetting the
demand tariff or should two separate
loggers be required?
6 Should all DG require two way TOU meter-
ing and therefore in residential situations a
more focused tariff? (meaning that genera-
tion (and demand) at 6pm is worth  more
than at 1am say)
The key point established over this section is
that Line Companies do not need to be
Retailers and do not need to have the ability
to trade hedges, provided that a reasonably
priced FPVV contract can be obtained from a
Retailer.
The other alternative is for a DG operator to
choose to sell directly into the spot market if
that is deemed more desirable.
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7  ENERGY CONTRACTS
From the preceding section:
• the optimum contract that a DG (producing
electricity only for sale, as opposed to an
industrial co-generation arrangement)
owner could have, is a reasonably priced
FPVV contract.  As noted previously, we
believe that for >10kW loads this should
have a ‘spread’ limited to 10% when
compared with an FPVV contract for energy
purchase at the same or electrically similar
node and the spread should be zero for
less than 10kW loads.
• The optimum contract a purchaser of
electricity (excluding self generation on
site) might want may be either an FPVV
contract or a spot and hedge contract
• A Retailer is the only party that can
effectively bridge this potential mismatch,
because the Retailer is in the best position
to manage the spot price risk on two
counts.
1 The retailer is vertically integrated and
as such is privy to a natural but flexible
hedge and
2 The Retailer is probably a participant in
Energyhedge and can pick up the best
priced  CfD’s  from the other Partici-
pants (the big Gentailers).
3 The diversity and scale of the Retailer’s
loads, of which the DG is a fraction of a
percent.  The DG is insignificant in
comparison to the total load supplied
by the Retailer who is effectively buying
physical electrons at spot prices from
many sources via the grid.
• The FPVV contract from the Retailer can
additionally include the line charges (see
next section – section 8), or a separate line
contract between the DG owner and the
line company may be entered into.  How-
ever some line companies are not keen to
have direct contracts with DG owners as
their administration systems and databases
are not set up for this.
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8  LINES COMPANY CONTRACTS
Line companies generally bill Retailers for
applicable local network charges (their own)
and Transmission charges (from Transpower).
The Retailer then bundles these charges up
and on-charges the consumer for line charges
and energy charges and EC levies on the same
invoice.
The Transpower charges are split into connec-
tion and interconnection charges. The former
relates to assets specific to the consumer, or
set of consumers, and the interconnection
charge is currently a postage stamp single
charge across the country of ~$60/kW of MD.
MD is maximum demand and is defined as the
average of the 12 highest half hour peaks over
the last twelve months.  This means that if a
DG is down for 6 hours and no demand
response is undertaken a client will be strad-
dled with the resulting MD and associated
Transpower interconnection charge for the next
12 months. Note that there is a proposal out
for consultation which splits the country up
into 4 regions and the MD will be calculated
from the X highest peaks over the last 12
months in the couple of hours of the morning
and evening system peak periods. X will
remain 12 for the upper North Island and upper
South Island but be set at 100 for the lower
North Island and lower South Island.
The new Transmission pricing policy should
marginally benefit DG in so far as it is based
on the REGIONAL COINCIDENT peak (as seen by
Transpower and charged to the line Co) - the
MD calculation of that peak is covered above.
The network charges are varied between each
local line company and within each company
to the extent that there are hundreds of
different network charging structures across the
country.  Suffice to say that efficient pricing
structures incentivise the consumer to do what
the network company believes is the best way
to optimize the networks assets in terms of
reducing peaks (capacity which needs to be
provided), keeping power factor close to unity
(excessive current/voltage drop considerations
affecting real power carrying capacity) and
ability to shed load in circumstances that
require limitations on power transfer from time
to time.
A typically efficient line charge might have a
kVAh charge (disincentivising poor power
factor) on all power consumed and a peak KVA
charge covering the network peak hours plus a
daily charge recovering site specific connection
assets.
In this regard any embedded DG with a
synchronous generator (as opposed to an
induction generator or PV) would benefit from
this type of network charging in so far as the
synchronous generator can generate KWh
(active) and KVARhs (reactive) thereby reducing
the (efficient) KVA line charge for real net
demand, considerably more than if the network
charging structure were inefficient and based
on KWh and KW charging alone.
So it is important to get networks to create
fewer and more efficient line charging schemes
so that DG is better incentivised.
We also note that the 28 (current) distributors
are each at different stages of investment with
respect to load growth.  This results in some
networks having over capacity (eg Powerco-
due to lower than expected regional consump-
tion growth). This means they do not derive
much benefit themselves from new DG or
alternatively Orion whose network is near its
capacity limit and who is using DG to effec-
tively delay new investment as the optimum
way to contain network charges.
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9  OVERSEAS METHODS WITH DG
Australia
When a DG proposal is mooted, a thorough
system stability analysis has to carried out by
the local network. This is expensive and takes
many months and must be paid for by the
proponent.  However, where the DG is
renewably fuelled the Australian Greenhouse
Office (AGO) have developed a REC scheme
(refer next section) to effectively provide a
subsidy of the order of 3c/kWh on the green
electricity generated.
The programme was very successful in achiev-
ing the 2% target of increased renewable
generation, however, once the target was
achieved a new target was not set and the REC
market died.  The programme did however
miss one important point. It focused on
electricity rather than energy.
The downside of this Australian regime was
that it did not sufficiently incentivise co-
generation, where electrical efficiency is usually
traded off against overall efficiency. (eg a wood
fired condensing steam turbine may have a
34% efficiency with all output being electricity,
whereas a wood fired backpressure steam
turbine exhausting to a manufacturing process
may have an 75% energy efficiency but only
12% of the output is electricity).  If a REC
system were adopted in NZ it should include
both electrical RECs and thermal RECs so that
co-generation, which is the most energy
efficient process, is correctly incentivised. For
instance a thermal REC might be a third as
valuable as an electrical REC.  This would
incentivise a biomass co-gen over a biomass
fuelled condensing steam turbine for instance.
Britain
Britain has publicly stated goals that aim to
make 40% of residential energy consumption
coming from renewables as well as improving
the energy efficiency of consumption. As part
of this initiative they have embraced wind
farms and CHP stirling engines in homes.  In
various areas/regions, they have provided a
regulatory $8.8/kW/yr incentive for 5 years from
commissioning.5  There are renewables targets
set for 2010 and 2015, current proposals are
mainly wind.
Europe
The predominant incentive mechanism for
renewable generation in Europe comes in the
form of Feed-in-tariffs (FIT’s). Essentially FITs
are guaranteed payments for up to 20 years for
any renewably fuelled electricity DG injecting
into the network.
Similar to RECs (in Australia) the renewables
are effectively subsidised by levying a very
small amount across all consumers in the
country.  This funding charge can be a levy on
kWh’s consumed or a small additional levy on
rates.  The former would appear to be the
more economically efficient method.
The evidence in all these cases suggests that
progressive Governments believe that DG,
particularly renewably fuelled DG, is a desirable
resource, supporting diversity and security and
should be encouraged. This is interpreted to
mean that if an optimal volume of DG does not
occur through normal commercial activity, an
incentive should be provided.
5 Paper to CAE’s DG conference in Auckland 15 June 2006.
Jonathan Russell ‘DG and the UK regulatory environment’.
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10 MANDATORY RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGETS
(MRETs) AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
CERTIFICATES (RECs)
The essence of the Australian scheme is as
follows:
a The Federal Government decided that they
would target a 2% increase in renewables
by 2005 which equated to 9500GWh pa.
This meant that the Nation’s renewables
content of generation would move from
10% to the target of 12%.
b The obligation to make this improvement
would fall on the retailers of electricity
proportionately. That is, if Retailer X had
sales of 10% of the nation’s demand then
Retailer X would be responsible for provid-
ing 10% of 9500GWh of new renewables,
that is, 950 GWhpa.
c By building MW of renewables the owner
created REC’s (Renewable Energy Certifi-
7 The Australian Greenhouse Organisation  ref
www.ago.org.au
cates), the units of which were
‘renewable energy generated’ (kWh) .
d Each year the Retailer was required to
lodge his share of RECs with the AGO
(Australian Greenhouse Office).
e If Retailer X had not generated sufficient
REC’s to cover his obligation, the Retailer
was required to purchase the shortfall
either from another party with excess RECs
or from the AGO7 at the fallback price of
4c/kWh.
f The result of this was that an incentive was
established, for anyone interested in
investing in renewables, to the tune of say
3c/kWh (ie something under the fallback
cost of 4c/kWh), as the trading market in
REC’s developed.
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11  RECOMENDATIONS
As far as New Zealand is concerned it is the
author’s view that for improved uptake of DG
one or more of the following should be in
place:
a A regulation which requires retailers to
provide a ‘limited spread’ Fixed Price
Variable Volume contract (FPVV) to DG
operators. Limited spread refers to the
differential between what the Retailer
would charge a load for energy at the
point of connection, compared to the price
a Retailer would pay a distributed genera-
tor for energy at the same point of
connection.  Using the Energyhedge
approach, this ‘spread’ should be limited
to 10% for installations >10kW and should
be zero for installations below 10kW.
b If item a. above were mandated, then
there would be no need for Distributors to
be Retailers and neither would there be
any requirement for Distributors to be able
to deal in financial instruments such as
hedges (or contracts for differences).
c Line companies should be required to
provide a rebate of Transpower’s intercon-
nection charges based on the DG output at
the times of regional peak.
d If the regional DG is aggregated, the
Distributor will be sure that if a ‘control
period’ is indicated it can count on at least
60% of the aggregate DG capacity being
started.  This has considerable value to
certain Distributors.  The value of lost load
should be considered in these calculations
and/or the value of delayed network or
Transmission investment. (Orion’s approach
to using DG owned by third parties).
e DG operators should be required to pay
for any DG specific upgrade of the network
required to connect to the network. This
can be paid ‘up front as a lump sum’ or
amortised over the life of the plant at the
DG operators option. (Two way metering, a
transformer or line upgrade if necessary to
support the DG could be possible inclu-
sions). The line company should be
required to obtain three separate quotes for
the equipment and installation.  In the
future, should a third party benefit from the
line upgrade paid for by the DG owner, the
DG owner should receive some rebate on
previously paid costs.
f Line Company’s need to compensate DG
operators for Reactive power generated
(KVARs).
g If there is a political desire to increase the
uptake of DG, a subsidy may be required.
One such incentive would be a $/MW
installed contribution for new DG installa-
tions.  This is what operates in the UK and
underlies their recent sustainability policy.
h Another form of subsidy for renewables
(again which links into the Governments
framework on sustainability) is an MRET
scheme. That is, a Minimum Renewable
Energy Target scheme underpinned by
tradable renewable energy certificates
(RECs) as seen in a few countries but in
particular Australia. The Australian scheme
should be modified and improved for New
Zealand by having both Thermal and
Electrical RECs where a thermal REC is about
a third of the value of an electrical REC.
This allows a balanced incentive for co-
generation versus pure electrical generation,
a feature missing in the Australian scheme.
Under these schemes, effectively all consum-
ers of electricity pay a very small extra
amount which is used to provide a worth-
while (in the region say of 3c/kWh) subsidy
to new renewable generation.
i With the thresholds regime governing
Distributors, the issue of cross-subsidisation
by Distributors of inefficient generation from
monopoly profits should no longer be a
potential issue. There is an argument that
the arms length separation rules for Dis-
tributor owned generation between 5and
50MW could be relaxed, in particular the
need for an independent board for the
generation subsidiary which has a negative
effect on DG uptake over 5MW by Line
companies.
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APPENDIX 1: List of DG installations
Metered Distributed generation plants, connected to Distribution networks at 33kV or less and < 50MW.
(Note: This schedule is a work in progress at the date of this report)
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APPENDIX 2: People interviewed
Purpose: To discuss definitions, officials position(s) and interviewees perceptions on barriers to entry for
DG and the views on alleviating those barriers
 
Wellington      
# Organisation Contact Position 
1 Ministry for Economic 
Development (MED) 
Gareth Wilson Roger 
Fairclough 
Janet Humphris  
Manager Network 
Performance 
Analyst 
3 Parliamentary Commisioner 
for the environment (PCE) 
 
Doug Clover 
 
3 Major electricity Users Group Ralph Matthes CEO 
4  Electricity Networks Ass Alan Jenkins CEO 
5 Biomass Assoc Brian Cox CEO 
6 Meridian Grant Smith Development Mgr 
7 Wind Energy Assoc Murray Kennedy  
8 EECA Fiona Weightman 
Selwyn Blackmore 
Mgr Elec to 
GridAnalyst 
9 EC Robert Reilly (acting) Retail Contracts 
advisor 
11 Business NZ George Riddell Manger Energy, 
environment etc. 
11 Smartpower Wgtn 
 
Anne Herrington 
 
Director 
 
12 Transpower Kerin Devine GM SO 
13 Contact Ted Montague  
14 Todd Energy Babu Bahirathan  
15 Energy in Industry Mike Suggate 
David Reid 
CEO 
16    
 
 
Auckland 
 
17 Watercare services Raoul Viljoen Energy Manager 
18 Vector Simon McKenzie 
Duncan Head 
David Kemshall 
Developmnt 
Manager 
 
19 Smartpower Akl Peter Alderdice  
20 Waste Management Malcolm Hope  
21 Mighty River Power Stuart Lush 
James Moulder 
Bruce Miller 
Development Mgr 
 
June to August 2006
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Christchurch 
 
22 Orion Roger Sutton CEO 
23 Mainpower Andrew Thompson 
Todd Mead 
 
24 Christchurch City Council Leonid Istkovich Energy Manager 
 
 
Other 
 
25 Unison Ken Sutherland CEO 
26* The Lines co Brent Norris Chief Engineer 
27* Eastland Energy Matt Todd CEO 
28* Power Co Ted Broadhurst  
29 WEL networks Mike Underhill CEO 
30* Top Energy Roger de Bray CEO 
31 independent Martin Post Independent DG 
owner/contract 
installer 
32 Mt Campbell Networks ltd Lloyd Wensley Indep. DG owner 
33 Clearwater Hydro Michael Davis Indep. DG owner 
 
* not interviewed at date of draft report 
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APPENDIX 3: Regulations summary
The tabulation below sets out regulations proposed by the MED for Distributed Generation connection
above 10kW.
pp
Actions required by person wanting to 
connect distributed generation 
Actions required by distributor 
1. Makes formal enquiry, in writing, about 
possible connection. 
1. Within required timeframes, provides 
advice on: 
• network capacity or upgrades that might 
be needed to connect and receive 
electricity from the proposed distributed 
generation; and 
• investigative studies that might be 
needed. 
2. Makes application to connect, completing 
an application form and forwarding required 
accompanying documents including any 
required investigative studies and information 
to support compliance with the distributor’s 
network safety and connection requirements 
and an acceptable industry standard. 
2.  Processes application within required 
timeframes or advises an extension of time 
for processing.  May seek additional 
information from the applicant to assist 
processing. 
3.  Approves or declines application.  
4.  Enters into connection contract. 
3. Either may export electricity to network 
upon receipt of approval subject to payment 
of any connection costs and complying with 
connection contract; or 
If application declined, may seek review of 
decision by an arbitrator. Arbitrator’s decision 
is binding on both parties. 
5. If arbitration process is invoked then must 
cooperate with arbitrator. Arbitrator’s decision 
is binding on both parties. 
Ref: www.med.govt.nz/electricity/generation-investment/
www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSumary_1329.aspx
Page 40 DG: Understanding the Market
The Ministry for Economic Development (MED) has recently (Sept 2006) issued the Electricity Governance
(connection of Distributed Generation) regulations 2006 (Regs) for consultation.  These specify that if the
owner/operator of a potential distributed generation scheme cannot reach a suitable agreement to
connect then the following regulations will apply:
 Size <10kW 10kW-1MW 1-5 MW >5MW Regulation 
clause 
1  Distributor to respond to 
an enquiry in X days 
20 20 30 30 15 
2 Distributor to respond in X 
days to a formal 
application 
10 45 60 80 3& 
Subclause 
2 
3 Distributor to maintain 
confidentiality 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
4, 3 
4 Max fee under regs. 
for formal enquiry 
process 
$250 10-00kW 
$500 
100kW-1MW 
$1000 
 
$5000 
 
$5000 
Schedule 4 
5 Max fee for application 
To connect 
$250 $500 $5000 $5000  
 
6 Additional fees for 
inspection or observation 
Includes: 
- installation of meters 
- pre connection inspection 
- observation of testing perhaps 
- provision of written authorization to connect 
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APPENDIX 4: Sensitivity analysis on
Diesel peak lopping
Sensitivity of Transmission interconnection charge to DG feasibility
Load Duration Curve
% peaks 
lopped 
#/yr of half 
hour peaks 
@ 2hrs/day, 
# days /yr 
Assume 330 KW  
Diesel generator 
(KWh generated) 
Savings 
(net costs) 
K$/yr 
0.5% 88 22 days 14,454 (106  ) 
1.0% 175 44 days 28,908 (144  ) 
1.5% 263 66 days 43,362 ( 182 ) 
2.0% 350 88 days 57,816 (219) 
2.5% 438 110 days 72,270 (258) 
Assume:
• Diesel costs 100c/Litre
• Diesel efficiency 40%
• Assume 330 KW Diesel costs $660K and is amortised over 20 years at 12%
• Transpower interconnection charge is $60/kW MD
• MD is average of the 12 highest half hour peaks over last 12 months
Peak
Load
kW
% time below Y kW
0% 50% 100%
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Note: any new Hydro is costed at 9 c/kWh and the graph above suggests that there are at least 21 years
of new generation by the time that hydro is built.  More importantly there is a thermal generation price
point of 8c/kWh.  This is the price level to which DG should be able to shadow price to remain economi-
cally viable
APPENDIX 5: New generation and price curve
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000
Cumulative New Capacity (GWh)
G
en
er
at
io
n 
Co
st
 (c
/kW
h)
Note: additional domestic gas
discoveries could lead to further
generation at around this price
Demand increases by about 800GWh/year
Large capacity possible at this
price based on coal (domestic
or imported) or LNG
Geothermal Wind Coal/LNG Hydro
Indicative New Plant Generation Costs to 2025
Longer term supply options
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